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19 February 1959

Copy No. C b3

CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE  
BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 30  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HP O2  
DATE: 4-4-80 REVIEWER:  

State Dept. review completed

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 February 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: In his speech at Tula on 17 February, Khrushchev adopted a defiant attitude toward the Western powers' determination, reaffirmed in their notes of 16 February, to uphold by all appropriate means their communications with West Berlin. He repeated previous public warnings that "if anybody should start shooting, this would mean the beginning of war." Khrushchev's tough line on negotiations suggests the USSR will promptly carry out its announced intention to transfer control over Allied access and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the West rejects Soviet proposals on Berlin and a German treaty. His favorable reference to Senator Mansfield's proposal for direct negotiations between East and West Germany underscores Moscow's effort to confront the West with a choice between measures carrying a serious risk of war or concessions which would erode the Western position on Berlin and German reunification.

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Communist China: Peiping radio has broadcast two recent articles from the party's leading newspaper and theoretical journal with the stated purpose of refuting US and other Western criticism of the commune program. This and similar articles in the past indicate the degree of Peiping's sensitivity to adverse international reaction to this program. The commune system continues to receive a very bad press throughout Asia, with the exception of Cambodia. While the Chinese Communist party's December plenum modified some of the extremes of the program, such as measures affecting family life and personal property, Peiping intends to push the development of communes in 1959.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Cyprus: Emergency meetings of the British, Greek, and Turkish foreign ministers dealing with the Cyprus issue are being held in London to avert complete breakdown of negotiations following the "dramatic quarrel" between Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Archbishop Makarios. This split, plus delays and disruption resulting from the crash of the Turkish prime minister's plane, has caused a serious loss of momentum in the talks which opposition elements in all areas will probably attempt to exploit. A formal break between Karamanlis and Makarios would cause Karamanlis serious political difficulty in Greece.

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Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

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Iran: Current tensions between Iran and the USSR can be expected to continue and, with the signing of the Iranian-US bilateral agreement, to increase to a point short of direct military action.

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Morocco: King Mohamed V plans to be away from Morocco from 20 February through 5 March. He will visit Corsica and Madagascar. At a time when the country is embroiled in a political contest between factions of the ruling Istiqlal party, his absence will invite more instability.

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Guinea - Soviet bloc: Guinea appears to be responding to the Soviet bloc's campaign to establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with the independent states of West Africa. Sekou Touré's government signed a trade and payments agreement with a visiting Soviet trade mission on 13 February, and is in the process of concluding new arrangements with several Eastern European satellites. A Bulgarian ambassador has reportedly already presented his credentials in Conakry.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Khrushchev Defies West on Berlin

Khrushchev's speech at Tula on 17 February underscored Moscow's current efforts to confront the Western powers with a choice between risking war to enforce their right of access to Berlin or making concessions which would erode their position on Berlin and German reunification. The Soviet premier adopted a defiant attitude toward the West's intention, reaffirmed in the notes of 16 February, to "uphold by all appropriate means" its communications with Berlin.

Khrushchev said Soviet troops in East Germany are not there to play games and repeated previous public Soviet warnings that "if anybody should start shooting, this would mean the beginning of war."

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Khrushchev also sought to discourage any belief that Western access to Berlin could be maintained by an airlift if the land routes are closed. He asserted that East Germany would obtain full sovereignty by the conclusion of a peace treaty and would vigorously rebuff any encroachment on its territory by land, air, or water. This formulation seems to imply that a separate treaty might be speedily concluded either prior to or simultaneous with the transfer of access controls to the East Germans.

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Khrushchev's tough line on negotiations with the West suggests that if the West rejects the Soviet proposals regarding Berlin and a peace treaty signed by both German governments, the USSR will promptly carry out its announced intention to transfer the controls and sign a separate treaty with East Germany. He ridiculed the Western formula of "no concessions without counterconcessions" and said, "We... have nothing to concede. We made our proposals without bargaining."

Moscow's apparent belief that its threatening posture on Berlin will force the West to move toward at least de facto recognition of East Germany was reflected in Khrushchev's

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favorable reference to Senator Mansfield's proposal for direct negotiations between the two German governments on unification of both Berlin and Germany.

Khrushchev concluded his speech with a sharp attack on the Shah of Iran for breaking off his negotiations on a nonaggression pact with the USSR. His statement that the USSR will "see to it that the people of Iran understand our attitude correctly" probably foreshadows an intensified Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the Shah's regime.

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Cyprus Situation

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[An emergency meeting at the foreign ministers' level was called in London on the evening of 18 February to prevent the threatened collapse of the conference seeking agreement on the terms for an independent Cyprus. The urgent meeting follows reports that Archbishop Makarios has broken with the Greek Government and no longer accepts the Cyprus agreement reached between Athens and Ankara on 11 February. The future of the conference now depends on Makarios, as Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriots have agreed on the terms for a settlement. Failure to secure the archbishop's approval would eliminate hope for a solution at present and could lead to a renewal of the struggle on Cyprus. The possibility cannot be precluded that Makarios is maneuvering for further concessions, which would also enhance his political stature in both Cyprus and Greece.]

[Makarios' opposition to the agreement appears concentrated on the terms providing for British base rights on Cyprus, and the right of Britain, Greece, and Turkey to intervene if Cypriot independence is threatened. There may also be problems in London regarding the timing and method of execution of the agreement, the degree of Turkish Cypriot participation in the government, and the question of whether or not Cyprus will remain within the British Commonwealth. Makarios' advisers reportedly are pressuring the archbishop to submit any plan for Cyprus' future to a plebiscite on the island.]

[If the London conference fails to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus issue because of Makarios' objections, an open break between the Greek Government and the Cypriot Ethnarchy is virtually certain.]

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[A final break between Karamanlis and Makarios would have serious consequences on the Greek political scene, with both Communist and nationalist opposition parties demanding the government's resignation. Karamanlis' ability to survive would depend on the loyalty of the members of his own party in the Chamber of Deputies, where he enjoys a small majority.]

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Moroccan King May Revisit Corsica and Madagascar

{King Mohamed V plans to leave Morocco on 20 February for a 12-day visit to Corsica and Madagascar. The King has long planned a "sentimental journey" to Madagascar, where he was imprisoned by France during the greater part of his 26-month exile in 1953-1955. At a time when the country is embroiled in a bitter political contest between factions of the ruling Istiqlal party and tribal disorders in north and central Morocco have not been quelled, his absence will invite more instability.}

{Unless the situation worsens drastically, the King probably will proceed with the trip, returning before the month-long Moslem fast of Ramadan beginning about 11 March. As during other royal absences from the country, the crown prince probably will remain in Morocco to serve as regent. Because he became embroiled in difficulties on the two earlier occasions when he was regent--a tribal uprising two years ago and the opening of the offensive by Moroccan irregulars against the Spanish enclave of Ifni in western Morocco in November 1957--his authority may this time be drastically curtailed.}

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Guinea Increasing Ties With Soviet Bloc

Guinea appears to be responding favorably to Soviet bloc efforts to expand diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with independent states of West Africa.

Guinea was recognized by most Communist regimes soon after it became independent last October. Its first direct contact with the bloc was a trade and cultural accord last fall with East Germany. This was followed by a "general protocol" with Czechoslovakia envisaging trade relations and "economic and scientific technical cooperation"--terminology which has in the past sometimes meant the extension of bloc credits.

More recently Guinea received a commercial delegation from Poland and signed a formal trade and payments agreements with the USSR on 13 February which provides for an exchange of coffee, bananas, and other agricultural products for Soviet-manufactured and -processed goods.

Meanwhile, a Guinea delegation, including leftist Interior Minister Keita, has been accorded red-carpet treatment in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland this month. In East Berlin, the visiting Africans discussed implementation of the trade and cultural agreement and were promised a new gift radio transmitter. In Prague, where they were received by President Novotny, they apparently agreed to an exchange of diplomatic representatives in the "immediate future" and also to the establishment in Conakry of a permanent Czech trade delegation.

A Bulgarian ambassador who arrived in Conakry late in January apparently was the first chief of mission to present his credentials and may thus be dean of the local diplomatic corps.

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